notion that developments there might not be typical. Two subsequent research projects and the work of a dozen graduate students have convinced me that the use of churches and synagogues to promote education and upward mobility as well as to define, rationalize, and revitalize ethnoreligious identity was not unusual but rather characteristic of the urbanization of both American blacks and migrating East European villagers, whether in cities near their birthplaces or in Rochester, Cleveland, Chicago, and Minneapolis.'3 In light of this research America's "urban villagers," to use Herbert Gans's phrase, did not appear as resistant to change as Gans and others thought them to be, either in their new environment or in the village settings from which they came. John Briggs and Josef Barton have now offered persuasive evidence that rural villages in nineteenth-century Sicily, Calabria, and Transylvania underwent those social changes that are often labeled "modernization" or, perhaps less arguably, "urbanization" long before large numbers of their younger residents began to migrate to cities near or far away. With others I have concluded that such modernization also occurred in the Danube basin north of Belgrade, in the Austrian provinces of Slovenia, Galicia, and Bukovina, in Lithuania and Finland, and in that area that is now Eastern Slovakia and the sub-Carpathian Ukraine. Where these changes took place amidst a long-existing cultural diversity, the intertwining of religious feelings with ethnic interests and identities gave both to faith and to the sense of peoplehood a fluid and instrumental quality that was more future-oriented than backward-looking. Emigrants to the United States regrouped on this side of the Atlantic into larger aggregations that both preserved and revised inherited patterns of language, religion, and regional culture. These changes thus demonstrate a dynamic relationship between religion and ethnicity, not the static one that was long the model historians and sociologists followed. '4 Anthropologists, who came late to the game of modern ethnic studies, seem at the moment to be leading it, in part because they have never discounted the functional significance of religion in culture. True, the first generation, whose 13 I must here acknowledge my extensive debts to a group of student colleagues who have steadily shared their findings with me for a decade: Josef Barton, John Briggs, William Galush, Mark Stolarik, Matt Susel, Paula Benkart, Arunas Alisauskas, and Frederick Hale; most of their studies are cited below. For a brief report with little reference to the role of religion, to which I subsequently turned, see my "New Approaches to the Study of Immigration in Twentieth-Century America," AHR, 71 : 1265-79. For my recent review of these issues, see "Native Blacks and Foreign Whites: Varying Responses to Educational Opportunity in America, 1880 -1950 ," Perspectives in American History, 6 (1972 : addition to Barton's Peasants and Strangers: Italians, Rumanians, and Slovaks in an American City-that confirm our group's general findings about social mobility and, therefore, diminish the cogency of Stephan Thernstrom's Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth-C6entury City (Cambridge, Mass., 1964) , see Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis, 1880-I970 (Cambridge, Mass., 1973) , 76-176; and Thomas Kessner, The Golden Door: Italian and Jewish Immigrant Mobility in NVew rork City, 1880-1I95 (New York, 1977) , esp. 165-70. 14 (New Hiaven, 1978) , chaps. 1-3; and Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966) , [83] [84] . And see my "Lay Initiative in the Religious Life of American Immigrants, 1880-1950," in Tamara K. Hareven, ed., Anonymous Americans: Explorations in Nineteenth-Century Soccial Iistory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), 214-49. works historians know best, was preoccupied with premodern village or "tribal" societies, in which the whole population shared one language and faith. But anthropologists have closely observed the manner in which religious and communal rituals regulated behavior, legitimized power, transformed group memory into ideology, and gave social meaning to each stage in the cycle of individual lives. They have found that pervasive symbols and the recounting or re-enactment of traditional stories drew together the conceptions each people held of the actual and ideal worlds. Yet the preoccupation of anthropologists with such homogenous communities, usually at a given moment in time, provided little impulse to challenge assumptions about the essentially static character of religion in premodern societies.'5 After World War II the organization of new nations in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean requiring the political integration of disparate peoples posed questions that prompted a different theoretical approach. Clifford Geertz, who studied Javanese religious cultures, and J. C. Mitchell, who examined the shifting character of tribalism in urban Zaire, have stressed the conflict between such new "'integrative" states as Indonesia and what Geertz has called the "enduring structure of primordial identifications" rooted in religious as well as other aspects of primitive societies. Geertz's model and Harold J. Isaacs's development of it in Idols of the Tribe have proved attractive to historians and sociologists, in part, perhaps, because Geertz and Isaacs have not seriously disturbed the notion that sentiments that sustain both religion and a sense of unique peoplehood are archaic, even though surprisingly resilient. '6 Recently, Abner Cohen's studies of African cities-initially of the Hausa community of Muslim cattle merchants in Ibadan, Nigeria-sparked a quantum leap in the sophistication of anthropological inquiry into ethnicity.'7 Following his lead, scholars have examined the pragmatic and often protean uses of ethnicity in widely varying urban settings and have demonstrated that ethnic movements are often a political phenomenon-a mobilization of cultural resources, in which religion is sometimes central, to serve immediate "interests" or goals. These scholars have explicitly rejected the static "primordialist" dogma of Geertz and Isaacs at the very moment when some American historians were finding in it a comprehensive rationale for ethnic 15 For studies that depart from these assumptions, see Emerick K. Francis, In Search of Utopia: The Mennonites in Manitoba (Glencoe, Ill., 1955) , 5-7, 15-39; Martin Halpern, A Serbian Village (New York, 1958) 87-89, 126-29, 140-41 . For a parallel definition of the basis of ethnicity with a psychoanalytic orientation, see Harold R. Isaacs, "Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe," in Glazer and Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and Practice, 29-45. 6 Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States," in Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States (New York, 1963) , 90-114, 38-46, 144, 147-48, 150, 162-65 . Also see Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Social, and Civil Ties," British journal of Sociology, 8 (1957): 130-45;  and Geertz, The Religions of Java (1g60; reprint ed., Chicago, 1976), 1-15, Timothy L. Smith studies.'8 Even those who found Cohen's stress upon the political functions of ethnicity too narrow for the cases they studied have emphasized that the boundaries of peoplehood were elastic, not fixed, and that a new religious commitment often marked an outsider's incorporation within a group.19 Along with these advances in anthropology, sociology, and social history, two other scholarly developments especially pertinent to the American experience prompt me to propose a new beginning. First, historians of Central and Eastern Europe, following the lead of Peter F. Sugar and Donald Treadgold, have elaborated the ethnoreligious diversities that underlay political change in the Habsburg and Russian empires and in the Balkans as Ottoman control receded. The pluralistic and dynamic character of the relationships among the varied peoples of these regions helps explain the easy acceptance of pluralism by their emigrant contingents in the United States.20
Second, both Jewish and Christian scholars have promoted a broad renewal of interest in Old Testament theology, partly because of the retrospective impact of the Holocaust upon Jewish thought and partly because of the herculean research of William F. Albright and his students. This theological revival has emphasized Jahweh's covenant to sustain a particular people, formed by their acceptance of his law and lordship, in all the immense challenges of their centuries-long diaspora. Recent works such as Emil Fackenheim's God's Presence in History, which grounds the culture of Judaism in the Exodus, and Jiurgen Moltmann's Theology of Hope have underscored the contribution of Jewish messianism and Christian millennialism to the idea of progress. This wide-ranging scholarly effort to make biblical sense of "the reality we all live in," to use Geertzfs phrase, has demonstrated afresh that both Judaism and Christianity have aimed to hold together what Geertz calls "ethos," which he defines as a people's view of "right" ideals for life, and "world-view," by which he means their understanding of social reality. Furthermore, both faiths have sought this union of ethos and world-view not simply in the ritualized practices and symbolic behaviors that have pre-18 Abner Cohen, ed., lU'rban Ethnicity (London, 1974) , xii-xv, xxiii; David Parkin, "Congregational and Interpersonal Ideologies in Political Ethnicity," in Cohen, Urban Ethnicity, 119-27; and Edward Allworth, "Regeneration in Central Asia," in Allworth, ed., The Nationality Question in Central Asia (New York, 1973 1 For a discussion of the role of Pentecostal sects in the formation of the "Maragoli" group in rural Uganda, see S. R. Charsley, "The Formation of Ethnic Groups," in Cohen, lJrban Ethnicity, passim . Also see Shlomo D)eshen, "Political Ethnicity and Cultural Ethnicity in Israel during the 1960's," in Cohen, U rhan EthnlCity, 282-85, 294-97, '302-o6; and see Frederik Barth, Introduction, in Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston, 1970), 22-24, passim. 20 Sugar, "The Nature of Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule," Slavic Review, 20 (1963) : i6-24; Donald Treadgold, "The Peasant and Religion," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., The Peasant in NVineteenthCentury Russia (Stanford, Calif., i965), 72-107; Emanuel Turczynski, "Nationalism and Religion in Eastern Europe," East European Quarterly, 5 (1972): 468-86; and Stavrou Skendi, The Albanian Vational Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton, 1967 occupied Geertz but in a set of remarkably persistent and rationally communicated ideas, to which the notion of a pilgrim people is central.2' Students of American ethnic history have scarcely begun to see the implications or to sift out and assimilate the results of this recent scholarship. The reconstruction of Jewish and Christian theology in terms of historical process is especially important to an analytical synthesis of the relationship between religion and ethnicity. That synthesis should concentrate upon immigrants from Europe because they came to this country in such numbers as to dominate the history of American ethnic pluralism. Although the injustices suffered by black, Chicano, Oriental, and American Indian minorities justify the multiplication of works on their sociology and history, the result is a growing cultural lag in scholarship. Recent studies of these "racial" minorities routinely analyze aspects of their ethnoreligious systems that sustain emerging social and political objectives, whereas scholars usually treat the religious institutions, cultural forms, and ideologies of immigrant Protestants, Jews, Catholics, and Eastern Orthodox Christians as backward-looking, dysfunctional, or arcane. This essay aims to redress the balance by focusing primarily on the role of religion among groups recently dubbed "white ethnics" and by pointing out resemblances to the way churches have sustained black and Hispanic-American ethnicity.
THE MOBILIZATION
OF WHAT BECAME AMERICA'S IMMIGRANT PEOPLES began in most instances in their homelands, amidst a complex rivalry for economic and cultural advantage. Even in the Old World, the developing sense of peoplehood depended heavily upon religious identification, in some cases more so than upon language or myths about common descent. Migration to America, both before and after the United States became a largely urban and industrial society, produced three important alterations in the relationship of faith to ethnic identity: (i) a redefinition, usually in religious terms, of the boundaries of peoplehood, bringing folk memories to bear upon new aspirations; (2) an intensification of the psychic basis of theological reflection and ethnoreligious commitment, due to the emotional consequences of uprooting and repeated resettlement; and (3) a revitalization of the conviction, whether from Jewish messianism or from Christian millennialism, that the goal of history is the creation of a common humanity, a brotherhood of faith and faithfulness. The last two developments made the relationship between religion and ethnicity dialectical. Even while affirming that the unity of all mankind was the goal, intensified religious commitment defined more sharply the boundaries of subcultures and communities. In Western societies, both the confessional 21 Fackenheim, God's Presence in History: Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical Reflections (New York, I970), chaps. 1, 3; and Moltmann, Theology of Hope, on the Ground of the Implications of a Christian Eschatology (New York, 1967) . Also see Eric Voegelin, Order and History, vol. i: Israel and Revelation (Baton Rouge, 1956), ix, xi, 126-27;  and Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, 87-89, 139-41, 126-27 . For Timothy L. Smith state churches and some of the most intensely pietistic and sectarian groups in each of the major traditions-Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, and Protestanthave played a unifying role, even while ministering to regional, doctrinal, and ethnic divisions. How this was so in American immigrant communities and how it fostered that peculiar unity of opposites which John Higham has recently labeled "pluralistic integration" urgently needs clarification.22 This essay seeks to illuminate these three fundamental alterations in the relationship of faith to ethnicity in the United States by illustrating their pervasiveness and significance. Since the alterations began in Europe, I must begin by summarizing the religious aspects of the changes in culture, society, and ideology that took place there.
Long before the first substantial migrations of any people occurred, a mobile minority composed of clergymen, peddlers, fishermen, government officials, and soldiers had already sensed that they were part of a cultural community extending beyond their native villages and valleys. As the agricultural and commercial revolutions spread, moreover, "modern" ideas about personal success, individual autonomy, work, and risk taking penetrated even the most isolated European and Near Eastern villages. Conscription to the armed services took young men to distant places for short periods; agricultural laborers journeyed from the mountains to the plains at harvest time; and the expansion of trade first encouraged, then undermined, household industry. For decades, peddlers carted the new manufactured products across great distances. During the nineteenth century the railroads turned this trickle of goods into a torrent. The construction of railroads by wage labor recruited from villages where no one had ever seen a steam engine transformed rural economies and peasant perceptions of time and space. Meanwhile, the population explosion that began in the seventeenth century had prompted the migration of peoples such as the Scots, Germans, Jews, Rusins, and Rumanians into nearby lands and villages. The resulting conflict and accommodation among groups intensified the sense of uniqueness and sharpened the psychic boundaries that language, culture, and religion drew among peoples who lived close together.23
Ethnoreligious diversity characterized many of the areas of Western Europe that first sent peoples to America. Colonial Englishmen were highly conscious of the religious and other cultural characteristics that distinguished them' from Scottish, Welsh, and Scotch-Irish Protestants and especially from the Catholic Irish, whose migration to both English and American towns began Religion and Ethnicity in America I I63 in the middle of the eighteenth century. Northern Ireland, source of both Catholic and Protestant immigrants, gave colonial America a Scotch-Irish Puritanism quite different from the English variety dominant east of the Hudson River.24 German-speaking migrants from the Rhineland represented not only various Protestant communions-from Mennonites and Brethren to Lutherans and Reformed Germans-but, as time passed, Catholic and Jewish populations as well. Both of the latter groups came in large numbers from Bavaria in the decades before the Civil War. The Netherlands, whose Protestant and Catholic divisions were reflected in the earliest settlers of New Amsterdam, sent some Quakers and Mennonites and a large Dutch Reformed contingent to the Middle Colonies and, later, both Reformed Dutch and Catholic Belgians to the Midwest.25 Laplanders-some by language Swedish and others Finnish-were, like the Swede-Finns from certain Baltic islands, Lutheran in religion. In the decades preceding mass migration to America, all of the Scandinavian peoples experienced extensive religious awakenings that heightened their sense of identity as Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, or Finns.26
Population expansion, resettlement of peoples, and intensified ethnic rivalry also characterized Central and Eastern Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Rumanians, Orthodox in religion and speaking a language rooted in both Slavic and Latin, spread northward over the Transylvanian plateau, complicating the cultural map of a region long occupied by Germanspeaking Saxons, Magyars, and an older native population whose ethnic and linguistic identity remains unresolved. Meanwhile, contingents of Carpathian and Galician Jews moved southward into Transylvania, while others fanned out into what is now Slovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. In all of these regions, competition among peasants, tradesmen, and laborers for land and other economic advantages intensified the group loyalties originally defined by religion. Rumanian Orthodox chapels and fortress-like Saxon Lutheran churches still stand in separate sections of hundreds of Transylvanian villages; frequently, the same villages contain Jewish, Rumanian Greek Catholic, and (westward toward Hungary) Magyar Roman Catholic houses of (Phildelphia, 19490, 15, 30-31, 34-35, 71-72, 127-30, 137-38, 222-27, 261-64;  and L. C. Rudolph, Hoosier Zion: A Study of Presbyterianism in Indiana to I850 (New Haven, 1963) , i i8-29. 25 For careful essays on Lutheran, Reformed, Mennonite, Moravian, and Brethren immigrants, see F. Ernest Stoeffler, ed., Continental Pietism and Early American Christianity (Grand Rapids, 1976) . Also see Henry S. Lucas, Netherlanders in America: Dutch Immigration to the United States and Canada, I789-I950 (Ann Arbor, 1955) ; and Eric Hirshler, ed., 3ews from Germany in the United States (New York, 1955 Elsewhere in Eastern Europe not only the towns but many of the villages were cockpits of cultural, economic, and political rivalry among ethnoreligious groups long before mass migration to America began. In the Austrian province of Galicia, now southern Poland, Roman Catholic Poles, Greek Catholic or Orthodox Rusins (or Ukrainians, as some of them came to prefer to be called), and Orthodox and Hasidic Jews lived together uneasily in the same towns and villages. In the nineteenth century the government in Vienna counteracted Polish agitation for independence by supporting the communal enterprises of the non-Polish peoples. For similar reasons, the Prussian government usually supported German interests against the Polish population in Posen, Upper Silesia, and the province of West Prussia. Eastward in Bukovina and Lithuania, as in all of the long borderland from the Baltic to the Bosporus, the convergence of Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant peoples and the rapid expansion of the Jewish population created similar rivalries. The tsarist government, insecure in its control over the western provinces, sought stability through Russification. Along the Dalmatian coast from Trieste to Dubrovnik, Catholic Slovenes and Croats and Orthodox Serbs likewise often lived side by side. Their exposure to Italian and Greek influences through the Adriatic ports as well as their proximity to the large Muslim populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina made the coastal as well as many inland towns and villages arenas of competing cultures. In all of these regions, economic rivalries accentuated the divisions that religion and language defined, as the Religion and Ethnicity in America I I65 various peoples competed for possession of the soil and for commercial as well as agrarian markets.28
The ethnic mobilization of what became America's immigrant peoples began, then, in their homelands amidst complex economic and cultural rivalries. In each case the developing sense of peoplehood depended heavily upon a revitalization of religious faith and commitment. Religious awakenings helped define both the boundaries and the moral ideals of ethnic groups and thrust both townsmen and peasants toward the "modern" goals of autonomy, self-realization, and mobility that were crucial in the decision to migrate. The Irish national awakening, for example, may have helped generate and certainly drew inspiration from the "devotional revolution" which swept through Ireland and its emigrant colonies in England and America in the mid-nineteenth century. John Livingston's revivals, which "Presbyterianized" northern Ireland in the seventeenth century, had an effect upon the Scotch-Irish similar to that of the Wesleyan revival in England and the Pietist movements in Germany in the eighteenth.29 The awakening of Serbian Orthodoxy-through which Danilo jaksic, Bishop of Karlovac, marshaled cultural resources for the Serbian resurgence in the Croatian borderlandsroughly paralleled the invigoration of Carpathian Jewry by the intensely personal and communal piety of Hasidism. In the nineteenth century the Haugean and Johnsonian revivals among Norwegian Lutherans, the Ukrainian national movement that the Metropolitans of Lvov helped inspire, and the Slovak Catholic resistance to Magyarization also mobilized religious sentiments to serve ethnic purposes.30
Moralism, rooted in biblical teachings but made intensely personal in religious revivals, was an essential ingredient of modernization. The fashioning of "new persons"-involving new perceptions of individual worth, enlarged hopes for both this life and the next, and the internalization of moral 28 Regional religious organizations both sustained and restricted cultural awakenings. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, long before other agencies of modernization-railroads, newspapers, industrial employment, and the like-began deeply to affect group consciousness in isolated villages, the various religious communities-Roman and Greek Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, Eastern Orthodox, and Jewish-had fashioned hierarchies of communication or authority that sustained the efforts of pastors, priests, rabbis, and lay leaders to help the members of local congregations find in their faith the moral resources to take advantage of a world of enlarging opportunities. By the nineteenth century, these competitive ethnoreligious structures functioned much like American denominations and were the administrative units with which national or imperial governments dealt. In multi-ethnic regions, a single parish or synagogue often served a half-dozen or more villages, many of which contained sizable populations of other faiths. The pastor or rabbi moved from day to day and week to week across his broad territory, somewhat like an American circuit rider, attending to the needs of groups that in some villages were too small to meet anywhere but in homes. Nineteenth-century Lutheran bishops made regular official visits to Slovak congregations in the northern counties of the old Kingdom of Hungary, for example, as did Reformed bishops from Debrecen to their Magyar congregations in Slovakia and Transylvania. Both were concerned for the preservation of the language as well as the faith of these ethnoreligious communities and for the education as well as the economic advancement of the children. The structure of Jewish life, particularly of Hasidism, was too congregational to allow a formal hierarchy to develop. Yet certain rabbis or zaddikim were most frequently consulted on questions of behavior or belief, and all Jewish congregations 
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were preoccupied with the social welfare of their members. As a consequence, in many regions Jewish religious communities became as "denominational" as those of Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, and Greek Catholic Christians.33 Through this variety of cultural awakenings, then, ethnic consciousness fortified by religious faith took hold of the imagination of many Europeans. It affected most the younger people, especially those with the earliest and best opportunities for schooling-precisely the group that provided the majority of emigrants to the United States. By the time they began to consider the possibility of migration, the interweaving of religious and ethnic feelings had become for many a deep-seated habit of mind.34
Anticlericalism also flourished in nineteenth-century Europe. Some of the most socially progressive emigrants were hostile to doctrines and rites that they felt impeded progress. But they were a minority. The great majority of Greeks, Slovaks, Swedes, Magyars, Lithuanians, and Rusins that settled in America perceived their pastors, priests, or rabbis as agents of progress.35 In both the Old World and the New, clergymen provided moral guidance and spiritual comfort to families unable to sustain themselves on the land and dismayed by the manifold adjustments to a commerical or industrial economy. Pastors served as "spiritual advisers" to the many types of mutual benefit societies that spread through nineteenth-century Scandinavia, Germany, Sicily, Calabria, and the Habsburg Empire. They not only legitimized but sometimes, as in the case of the Norwegian moral revivalist Hans Nielsen Hauge, originated plans for the reorganization of economic life. Clergymen were interested in the social welfare of peasants, craftsmen, shopkeepers, and fishermen and served as spokesmen for ethnic interests that the policies of the English, German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian governments seemed to threaten. As a consequence, many clergymen performed a role in the mobilization of cultural resources that married ethnicity to religion on clearly "modern" terms.36 Such a role seemed even more appropriate in America, " For the "denominational" structure of religious life in eighteenth-century America, see my "Congre- THUS, THE THREE MAJOR ALTERATIONS in the relationship between ethnicity and religion that took place in America extended and intensified what had begun in Europe. The first of these, to which I now turn, was the redefinition of ethnic boundaries in religious terms. This involved a broadening of the geographic and linguistic backgrounds of persons deemed suitable for inclusion and frequently a decisive narrowing of religious ones.
That this nation's ethnic groups, viewed structurally, were made in America by the voluntary association of newcomers has long been evident.38 Less clear is the fact that the models for this development had emerged earlier in the multi-ethnic arenas of Europe. What in premodern societies had been the experience of wandering tradesmen, scholars, soldiers, government officials, and religious pilgrims-discovering far from their home villages persons similar to themselves in language, cult, or custom and accepting them as "'brothers and sisters" of presumed common descent-became routine among migrants to America. Ethnic organizations coalesced out of both economic and psychic need and found meanings for personal and communal life in the cultural symbols and the religious ideas that their leaders believed were marks of a shared inheritance and, hence, of a common peoplehood. Both the structure and the culture of these emerging ethnoreligious groups helped participants compete more advantageously with members of other groups. And, once established, each group constituted-in Milton Gordon's classic terms-a social system in which the members could satisfy all of their needs for structured human relationships from the cradle to the grave.39 The Ameri-Religion and Ethnicity in America I I69 can communities were not simply transplantings of Old World political and religious loyalties but reasoned efforts to deal with new challenges. That the national movements in Slovakia, Lithuania, and Poland drew heavily for inspiration, leadership, and funds upon their countrymen in the United States ought not to distort our understanding of the differing cultural, economic, and political purposes of the organizations that the immigrants founded here.40
Formal affiliation, however, turned on personal choice. Ethnic association-here defined as residence in a boarding house or tenement, membership in a local or national mutual benefit society, or participation in a musical, dramatic, or recreational club-was determined largely by the immigrant's identification with a particular religious tradition.4' The appeal of common language, national feeling, and belief in a common descent was sufficient in only a few minor cases to outweigh the attraction of religious affiliation as an organizing impulse.42 Two problems of perception have obscured this tact: the preoccupation of historians and sociologists with the secular aspects of ethnicity and nationality;43 and the unexamined assumption that the experiences of linguistic groups among whom no substantial religious divisions existed (Greeks, Poles, Italians, Slovenes, French-Canadians, Scots, and Chicanos) were typical of all groups. Scholars and journalists have written about a major religious segment of the German, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Arab, or Russian populations in America under the assumption that ethnic identity was defined by language, while largely ignoring another branch or branches of the same linguistic group whose ethnic life revolved around a different religious affiliation.44 40 Stolarik, "Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, Rise of Polish and Lithuanian Ethnic Consciousness in America, I860-IgI0 (Madison, Wisc., 1975) , 85-99, 143-53. 41 Several groups of graduate students and I have closely examined the marriage records of numerous immigrant congregations and the personnel records of the mutual benefit societies that supported them. We found that members of local ethnic communities almost invariably came from a wide variety of villages and usually from two or more regions in their homelands. Also see Vilho Niitemaa, "Emigrat,on Research in Finland," in Michael G. Karni, Matti E. Kaups, and Douglas J. Ollila, Jr., eds., The Finnish Experience in the Western Great Lakes Region: New Perspectives (Turku, Finland, 1975) (New York, 1974), 18-19, 30-32, 45-53, 102-05. 43 This preoccupation is especially obvious in the essays in Glazer 44 For one of the finer recent studies, see Kathleen Conzen, Immigrant Milwaukee, I836-I860: Accommoda-By its policy since 1920 of recording the "mother tongue" of the population, the federal Census Bureau has encouraged the notion that language was the bench mark of ethnicity. For their own reasons, the editors of foreign language newspapers have for decades declared this to be the case. Yet they, at least, knew that Norwegian and Danish were scarcely two languages, that Croatian and Serbian were closely related South Slavic dialects, that literary Ukrainian and Slovak were created in the nineteenth century in order politically to unite regional groups with diverse dialects, and that the dialects of northern and southern Italians were at least as dissimilar as Swedish and Norwegian.45 Consider, for example, the role of religion among Germans in America. Those who settled in colonial Pennsylvania were divided between the "church" party (Lutheran or Reformed), whose congregations also attracted settlers of those persuasions hailing from Switzerland or the Low Countries, and the "sectarian" groups which had Anabaptist or Pietist backgrounds. So sharp were the distinctions between these two general alignments and so insistent were the Mennonites, Moravians, and Dunkers upon their particular separateness that, if we stay with Gordon's functional definition, colonial Pennsylvania was the home of a half-dozen German ethnic groups. In the nineteenth century, large-scale immigration from Germany produced several new ethnoreligious communities: a Protestant one, bounded by the Missouri and Wisconsin Lutheran Synods; a Jewish community, the leadership of which soon passed to the Reform rabbis; a small but influential community of freethinkers, united in the Turnvereine; and the German Catholics. The organizational center of the last was not a separate church because Roman Catholic doctrine and structure forbade sectarian divisions; so the numerous local and national German Catholic mutual aid societies and their umbrella organization, the Central-Verein, provided a surrogate church and nurtured their sense of separate peoplehood.46 Although in the twentieth century all of the German ethnic groups responded in similar ways to the political crises that the two world wars created in their relationship to other Americans, their segregation in separate parishes, clubs, and neighborhoods as well as the separate paths they took toward accommodation with non-German Protestants, Catholics, and Jews made the notion of a common German "nationality" important only tion and Community in a Frontier City (Cambridge, Mass., 1976) . In the chapter on religious developments, Conzen has dealt with both Protestant and Catholic Germans, but not with Jews. The same is true of Carl Wittke's chapter on Germans, which also emphasizes free thinkers; Wittke, We Who Built America: The Saga of the Immigrant (rev. ed., Cleveland, 1964), 186-256. 4 Meic Stephens has covered some of these differences from the point of view of a Welsh nationalist who considers all Gaelic speakers as one people; see Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe, xix-xx, [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . 48 Religion and Ethnicity in America 1171 in the politics of foreign policy. By the 1920S the resistance of the separate German religious communities helped to abort plans for a German-American bloc in national elections.47 The unity which Bismarck imposed on a religiously plural Germany turned out in the American setting to be neither socially nor politically feasible.
A similar sharpening of the religious boundaries of ethnic association took place among Magyar immigrants, whom other Americans often labeled, inaccurately, "Hungarians." After I867 the Kingdom of Hungary conferred special privileges on minorities that accepted Magyarization in language and political loyalty, as did most of the Jews in the kingdom and scattered groups of Greek Catholic Rusins and Lutheran Germans. After 1903 the Hungarian prime minister extended this policy to Magyars and Rusins in the United States, secretly subsidizing congregations and newspapers whose leaders agreed to resist Americanization and to help keep their followers loyal to both the government and the religious organizations of their homeland. But the subsidies merely helped the Magyars in the United States do more conveniently what immigrants from other nations did on their own: develop increasingly separate ethnic communities-Catholic, Reformed, Lutheran, and Jewish-each sustained by a broad array of congregations, mutual benefit societies, and cultural associations. Until the 1930s, "Hungarian" synagogues stood aloof from both Reform and Orthodox rabbinical organizations; eventually, however, they did what some Magyar Catholics perceived at the outset was inevitable and became an ethnic subcommunity within a major religious tradition. Magyar Lutherans, most of whom joined the Missouri Synod, and the majority of the Reformed congregations, which accepted membership (and subsidies) from either the Presbyterian or Evangelical and Reformed denominations, followed a similar course.48
The Rusins, often called Ukrainians or Ruthenians, illustrate particularly well the role of religion in setting new ethnic boundaries. For decades the First Greek Catholic Union and its affiliated organizations defined the ethnic identity of persons of that faith so completely that Slovaks who had been Greek Catholics in Europe became Ruthenians in the United States. During the I89os wholesale conversions of Greek Catholic Rusins to Orthodoxy in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Ohio produced virtually all the "Russians" who lived outside California before 1920, a situation only slightly altered by the arrival after both world wars of refugees more accurately labeled "Rus-I I72 Timothy L. Smith sian. "49 One of the few exceptions to the rule that faith defined ethnic boundaries in America was a third contingent of Rusins-those of both Greek Catholic and Orthodox affiliation-whose political aspirations were so powerful in both the Old World and the New that they, their prelates, and their priests were swept into the Ukrainian national movement.50
The consolidation of New World ethnicity and Old World nationalism in Boston's Albanian Orthodox community is almost a caricature of the prevailing pattern. Albania was originally Catholic in the north and Orthodoxunder Greek bishops-in the south, but central Albania became Muslim as a result of the Ottoman conquest. In the I89os nationalists in the south began pressing the Greek hierarchs for priests and a liturgy in their own language and for the early establishment of an independent (in Orthodox terminology, "autocephalous") church. Albanians living outside the country in Bucharest, London, Cairo, and particularly America soon accomplished what the ecclesiastical authorities refused to allow in the home country. In 1903 Fan S. Noli, a native of Thrace who had lived for a time in Athens, moved to Egypt, where he met Orthodox nationalists. Three years later they sent him to Buffalo, New York to assist in the development of an Albanian mutual benefit society. The next year a Greek priest in Hudson, Massachusetts refused to allow a funeral liturgy for a young Albanian nationalist on the grounds that all such persons were automatically excommunicated. The members of the Boston community were outraged, and they persuaded Noli, in order to have him become their pastor, to accept ordination at the hands of the Russian archbishop in New York. Consecrated archbishop, Noli made the Albanian Orthodox Church, formally declared autocephalous in 1919, the center of the Albanian national movement. He translated and published for worldwide distribution an Albanian liturgy, printed textbooks in the native language for use in homeland and American schools, and influenced Catholic and Muslim leaders in the New World to use the pulpit as a forum to promote both Albanian nationalism and the ethnic advancement of their countrymen who had settled in America. When the end of the First World War brought independence to Albania, Noli returned to a land that had never been his home to become one of its first prime ministers.5' Much additional evidence of the overriding influence of religion upon identity-formation among other ethnic groups does not need recounting here. I have written elsewhere of the duality of communities, one Christian and the "AndrewJ. Shipman, "Greek Catholics in America," Catholic Encyclopedia, i5 vols. (New York, 1907-12 NJ., 1933), 194-98, passim. other anticlerical or socialist, that emerged around I900 among Catholic Slovenes and Lutheran Finns. A brief effort to unite all South Slavs in America on the basis of their common descent-as nationalists dreamed of doing in the old country-ran afoul of the Slovenes' belief that they were culturally superior to their fellow Catholic Croatians and the Orthodoxy of the Serbs. Meanwhile, Montenegrin immigrants and those Orthodox Macedonians whose language was Serbo-Croatian became Serbs in America. Slovaks of Catholic, Lutheran, Greek Catholic, and Presbyterian backgrounds managed to unite for a decade or so after I890 in the National Slovak Society, whose strongly political ideology was conditioned by long resistance to Magyarization in the old country; but congregations and mutual benefit societies soon formed separate national religious brotherhoods that proved to be the decisive catalysts of ethnicity and, eventually, the major avenues of accommodation to a wider American identity.52
The very recent emergence of working unity among Catholic HispanicAmericans illustrates the continuing role of religious affiliation in the evolution of the boundaries of ethnicity. To those Chicanos whose roots lay deep in the soil of the Rio Grande and lower Colorado valleys and in the southern California coastlands, the Anglos were the immigrants-but immigrants who held all the economic and political aces. The twentieth-century movements for social justice among Catholics, however, eventually produced in the American Southwest a band of nuns, teaching brothers, priests, and auxiliary bishops committed to promoting the welfare of Chicanos and of recent Mexican immigrants, whether in that region or in the shanty-towns that housed migratory agricultural workers from the Gulf states to Canada. This development roughly coincided with the emergence in eastern cities of a community of economic and political interests among groups of Catholics from Puerto Rico, Cuba, and other Latin American countries.53 During the 1970S liberation theology and the quest of Cesar Chavez and others for political clout in the large states of California, Texas, Florida, and New York brought Chicanos and urban Hispanics together. They built their unity, however, within the scaffolding of relationships, beliefs, and social aspirations that they shared as Catholics. In October I976 a Hispanic-American caucus exercised immense, though unpublicized, influence at the United States Bishops' Conference on Liberty and Justice for All, the first representative assembly of American Catholic clergy and laity held in the twentieth century. On the heels of that achievement, the Hispanic-American members of the United States Congress announced success in the long-frustrated effort to form a congressional caucus. If, as I believe, these developments affirm the mobilization of an enlarged 2 Smith, "Religious Denominations as Ethnic Communities: A Regional Case Study," 210-24; and Mark Stolarik, "Building Slovak Communities in America," paper read at the Hopkins-Harwichport Seminar in American Religious History, August 1974 . "3Joseph Fitzpatrick, Puerto Rican Americans (Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1970 ; Leo Grebler, J. W. Moore, and R. C. Guyman, The Mexican-American People: The Nation's Second Largest Minority (New York, I970), and Manuel P. Servin, ed ., The Mexican-Americans: An Awakening Minority (Beverly Hills, Calif., I970), 176-78, I88-92, 232-33. and powerful ethnic entity, its political as well as its economic significance reflects the successful linking of ethnic interests to religious idealism in broad strategies that are as much Catholic as Hispanic.54 THE CUSTOMS AND BELIEFS of particular varieties of faith and the traditions of loyalty to them seem, then, to have been the decisive determinants of ethnic affiliation in America. The availability of religious structures whose rituals were rooted in the past but whose doctrines sustained expansive hopes for the future does not, however, fully explain the changing relationship of faith to ethnicity in the United States. A second important alteration in that relationship was the intensification of the psychic basis of religious commitment that the acts of uprooting, migration, and repeated resettlement produced in the minds of new Americans. The most important of the several enduring contributions of Oscar Handlin in The Uprooted is his evocation of the anxieties, both personal and social, that resulted from forsaking an old home and searching for a new community. An intense interest in the religious meaning of their break with the past lay behind the preoccupation of both clergy and lay emigrants with religious organizations; and this interest stemmed from formidable psychic challenges.55
The individual's sense of responsibility for the decision to migrate was primary here. Loneliness, the romanticizing of memories, the guilt for imagined desertion of parents and other relatives, and the search for community and identity in a world of strangers all began the moment the nearest range of hills shut out the view of the emigrant's native valley. Longing for a. past that could not be recovered intensified the emotional satisfaction of daring to hope for a better future. Separation from both personal and physical associations of one's childhood community drew emotional strings taut. Friendships, however, were often fleeting; and the lonely vigils-when sickness, unemployment, or personal rejection set individuals apart-produced deep crises of the spirit. At such moments, the concrete symbols of order or hope that the village church and priest and the annual round of religious observances had once provided seemed far away; yet the mysteries of individual existence as well as the confusing agonies of anomie cried out for religious explanation.5" For this 54 This development is contrary to what Andrew Greeley expected only five years ago; see his Ethnicity in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance, 295. My account is based on interviews with officers of the Mexican American Cultural Center in San Antonio. As a consultant to the Bishops' Conference on Liberty and Justice for All, I witnessed the immense influence exercised by the Hispanic-American caucus. Also see Jacques E. Levy, Cesar Chavez: Autobiography of La Causa (New York, 1975), 453-62; and Francis P. Firenza, "Latin American Liberation Theology," Interpretation, 28 (1974) : 441-57. For eschatological, ecumenical, and biblical perspectives, see Juan Luis Segundo, S. J., Liberation of Theology, trans. John Drury (New York, 1976) , 138-51, 228-37. 5 Handlin, The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People (Boston, 195 1) . Harold Isaacs has seen the psychic intensity but not the theological implications of uprooting and migration; "Basic Group Identity: Idols of the Tribe," 34, passim. But such theological implications gave ideological and emotional stamina to ethnoreligious groups; see Timothy L. Smith, "Refugee Orthodox Congregations in Western Europe, 1945 -1948 ," Church History, 38 (1969 : 320-26; and Stanford E. reason, I shall argue, migration was often a theologizing experience-just as it had been when Abraham left the land of his fathers, when the people of the Exodus followed Moses into the wilderness, and when Jeremiah urged the exiles who wept by the rivers of Babylon to make the God of their past the hope of their future. Preoccupation with the ethical dimension of faith was one outcome of such uprooting. Once in America, immigrants uniformly felt that learning new patterns of correct behavior was crucial to their sense of well-being. Everything was new: the shape and detail of houses, stairways, windows, and stoves; the whir of engines, trolleys, furnaces, and machines; the language, facial expressions, dress, table manners, and forms of both public and private courtesy; and, most important of all, freedom from the moral constraints that village culture had imposed in matters monetary, recreational, occupational, alcoholic, educational, and sexual. Each immigrant had to determine how to act in these new circumstances by reference not simply to a dominant "host" culture but to a dozen competing subcultures, all of which were in the process of adjustment to the materialism and the pragmatism that stemmed from the rush of both newcomers and oldtimers to get ahead."7 This complex challenge to choose among competing patterns of behavior affected immigrants in all periods of American history; and they persisted in dealing with it on religious terms. At the turn of the twentieth century, Father Paul Tymkevitch declared that the greatest need of young Rusin Greek Catholics was to acquire "habits" -patterns of behavior ratified by both conscience and example and imprinted by repetition, patterns that would make each person his or her own monitor.58 But which cultural home should a young man choose? The tradition-oriented group that had preceded him here from the old country and presented itself as guardian of a past he sensed must disappear? The value system of the Americanizing culture-brokers living on the fringes of his own community?
The culture of what he perceived to be a "successful" immigrant group that I I 76 Timothy L. Smith settled here earlier than his own? One or another of the "native" American subcultures shared by persons of his religious faith? Or the secular and hence nonethnic culture of the wider "urban community," which he identified with mass communications, politics, popular entertainment, and a soulless economic order? When one personal crisis or another prompted fears of the dissolution of the person the young immigrant thought he had been, ordinary questions of behavior led into more profound ethical ones, setting the terms by which the religion of his forbears had to respond. Occasionally, the response was a radically perfectionist one.59
What Marcus Lee Hansen has called "immigrant Puritanism" owed virtually nothing to colonial New England. It was, rather, a predictable reaction to the ethical or behavioral disorientation that affected most immigrants, whatever the place or the century of their arrival. The surprising attraction of the nineteenth-century total abstinence movement to Irish, German, and Slovenian Catholics, as well as to Finnish Lutherans in Minnesota and Massachusetts, illustrates the force of that reaction. 60 Europeans sometimes complain that American religion is too much concerned with ethical behavior and too little with theological reflection. But to a nation composed of so many migrating peoples, action-right action-was the name of the game. The immigrant's religion needed both rule and the reformation of rules, both the law and the prophets.6' Once conceptions of identity and proper behavior had been wrenched loose from the past, the theological interest of new settlers moved naturally to a deep fascination with the future. From its colonial beginnings, the migration of bonded groups or the formation of such groups in the new land made the biblical imagery of the Exodus seem a metaphor for the American experience, not only for English Puritans and Russian Jews, but for Christian villagers of Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox persuasions from all parts of Europe. If the last great wave did not find urban America to be the promised land, the Religion and Ethnicity in America I I77 vision of what William Ellery Channing called, in millennial and Protestant terms, "a Better Day" remained pervasive among them. Charismatic leaders in all ethnic groups were messianic and anticipated something like a New Jerusalem. Linking the American future with the Kingdom of God was not, therefore, an exclusively Yankee obsession, nor the Social Gospel a Protestant preserve. Jews of both Reform and Orthodox faith, radical Irish as well as Chicano Catholics, and Mormon converts from Europe (whose trek to the Great Basin Kingdom seemed at first a flight away from civilization rather than a pilgrimage toward a better one) have also been people of the dream. 62 Out of this pervasive social idealism emerged a conviction among both Jewish and Christian groups that theirs were pilgrim peoples, who had by their own choice responded to a divine call and made a covenant to walk with God. Covenant theology, which Perry Miller has demonstrated was central to the Puritan "errand in the wilderness," turns up at least occasionally in the faith of almost every American ethnic group. 63 We are not surprised, of course, to find Dutch Reformed, Scottish and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, French Huguenots, and Reformed Magyars voicing this theme; their heritage in the Genevan Reformation, whether filtered through the Westminster Assembly of Divines or not, is obvious. But when Mennonites and Pietist Moravians sing about it in colonial Pennsylvania and pioneer Baptists, German Lutherans, and Scandinavian free-churchmen in the Ohio Valley pick up the refrain, we must stop to listen. We hear echoes of the same conviction in the appeals of nineteenth-century Irish, German, and French Catholic missionaries to the Midwest and, later, in the pastoral addresses of Eastern Orthodox bishops. The doctrine of a people in covenant with God attracted individuals who in the American mazeway bonded themselves in faith with persons whom they would have regarded as strangers in their homelands.64 Only in the last few decades have students of the ancient Near East discovered evidence that belonging in ancient Israel may have rested less on descent from II80 Timothy L. Smith As in the cases of migrating Quakers and Mennonites in colonial Pennsylvania, growing attachment of nineteenth-century ethnic denominations to the authority of the Bible stemmed from expanding perceptions of the relevance of its central principles to new situations.73 Leaders of the Christian Reformed Church, composed of Dutch Calvinists who emigrated to the upper Midwest after the American Civil War, explicitly disavowed both Old World social customs and their own formal commitment to a literal interpretation of Scripture when they supported the prohibition movement. The broader biblical principle of love for one's neighbor and of responsibility to bear his burdens, they said, was in this case binding. For two decades Swedish Mission Covenant congregations in America were able to cooperate with the Congregationalists at Chicago Theological Seminary because Paul P. Waldenstrom, their spiritual leader in Scandinavia, had taught them to use the Bible to cast off Lutheran scholasticism. His progressive use of scriptural authority-which exactly paralleled that of America's mid-nineteenth-century social reformers-held back his emigrant coreligionists from fundamentalism, even though they were committed to preserving the "fundamental" doctrines of Christian faith. 74 Major spokesmen for-Judaism also displayed growing attachment to scriptural as against traditional authority. Isaac M. Wise, in a series of essays and addresses in support of Reform Judaism, appealed to the biblical prophets and to modern rational judgment in declaring that the Ten Commandments were the essence of the Torah. The "Law of Moses," comprising the body of the Pentateuch, "reduces to practice the fundamental concept of the Decalogue," he said, "and expounds and expands its doctrines"; but the detailed provisions of Mosaic law were binding only upon Jews residing in the Land of Promise. The Ten Commandments are, however, "eternal law and doctrine," Wise declared. Progressive and law-abiding Jews must decide in the light of both conscience and reason which of their traditional rules and customs would fulfill those principles in the lands of their wandering and lead them to "salvation by righteousness." Solomon Schechter declared at the dedication " C. Norman Kraus, "American Mennonites and the Bible, 1750 -1950 
